Training to operate effectively in a new field of maneuver

It’s clear from the Department of Defense’s 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review, the Directive-Type Memorandum 09-026 about Internet-based Capabilities (IbCs) and the stand-up of CYBERCOM that DoD is committed to the Internet and IbCs.  To successfully navigate this field of maneuver, it’s critical that DoD appropriately train and equip its workforce, on both the responsible (defensive) and the EFFECTIVE (offensive) use of IbCs.

This includes incorporating IbCs into a number of already-existing training programs regarding the safe and secure use of DoD systems and handling of information: OPSEC, IA and Ethics.  It also includes developing and deploying NEW training that educates the DoD workforce about:

1. What are IbCs, social media and other emerging tools and technologies,
2. How to use these and technologies, and
3. How these tools and their FOUNDATIONAL PRINCIPLES, e.g. collaboration, crowdsourcing, information sharing, can improve mission effectiveness and efficiency throughout the Department.

Training the workforce on the RESPONSIBLE use but not the EFFECTIVE use of IbCs would be a tremendous missed opportunity for DoD. Learning to effectively utilize the IbC toolkit and concepts can increase mission effectiveness for public-facing areas like Public Affairs and Recruiting, AND ALSO for myriad other DoD missions which will benefit from internal, cross-component and cross-agency collaboration and information-sharing. It’s not about the tools and technologies; it’s about the behaviors that they enable.

IbCs not only enable people to work differently, they ENCOURAGE people to work differently.  This is a big cultural shift for all of us “digital immigrants”–especially within the command and control structure of DoD.  However, information sharing and collaboration are the behaviors that enable success in this network-based field of maneuver.  We can’t afford to stay in our hierarchical, need-to-know comfort zone.  The safety and security of our nation depends upon successfully leveraging the power of networks.

This is not just about Public Affairs Officers who officially manage DoD’s External Official Presences or senior leaders who officially represent the Department.  IbCs afford all members of the DoD workforce the access and influence previously only available public-facing functions. With anyone as a potential spokesperson for the Department in their professional communities, it’s critical that they are educated on the guidelines for using IbCs for Official Use.

Beyond the scope and substance of their official responsibilities, the DoD workforce and their family members–stakeholders with access to mission critical information–are using IbCs for personal use.  Therefore, responsible use includes extending (requiring?) OPSEC, IA and Ethics training to the entire DoD workforce and their families.

The challenge with moving these concepts forward is three-fold.  First, as a lowly contractor at DoD, I have the vision and ideas, but no authority to affect change, or even to secure the ear of a senior leader who does.  Second, even if I could secure an ear, its another thing to get DoD senior leaders to embrace these concepts and do things differently — not business as usual.  Third, “not my lane syndrome: these are cross-functional approaches which, in and of themselves require collaboration in development and deployment–not a single champion.

Defining the Scope of OpenGov at DoD

The Open Government Directive (OGD), encourages agencies to be more transparent, participatory and collaborative, internally, cross-agency and externally. It requires agencies to have an “open stance” rather than a closed stance regarding information sharing: “share it unless you can’t” rather than “don’t share it unless someone requests it.” This approach is similar to our judiciary stance and mantra “innocent until proven guilty” rather than guilty until proven innocent.

There are two ways to interpret this challenge. First, we can take the “push” approach and assume that information will be released unless there are security or policy reasons why it should not. Alternatively, we can take the “pull” approach and release information as an internal or external strategic need requests or requires the information. This latter approach can be likened to our current policies and practices around release of information under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA).

Open government poses a somewhat unique challenge for DoD, in particular. Last Tuesday, I participated in the fourth Open Government Directive: Lessons from the Playbook workshop. The purpose of this workshop was cross-agency sharing of emerging open government best practices, thinking and challenges. Attendees included representatives from many Federal agencies as well as from think tanks, corporations, non-profits, etc. We broke into smaller groups to discuss challenges including organizing data sets, culture change and measuring success. The wiki from this workshop is available here. I was amazed by the priority the OGD has for many agencies and wondered why it seems like a compliance-driven side project here at DoD…

The next morning, I participated in the National Academy for Public Administration’s Collaboration Project meeting at which representatives from four agencies–HUD, USDA, EPA and NASA–discussed their agencies’ efforts regarding the OGD. So I posed a question to the NAPA panel: openness is one thing for more public-facing agencies for which data transparency and citizen engagement are a part of their missions, but for DoD, openness is diametrically opposed to our core mission: to protect and defend. How do we reconcile this? Should open government become a secondary mission for DoD? Given the primary mission, will it not always be subverted? Or, should open government be seen as a new way to approach our core mission? I–as well as the panel–believe it’s the latter.

If this is the case, the objective of DoD’s Open Government Working Group is to weave the intentions and principles of open government–as well as the tools–into the fabric of DoD so that components ask “why can’t we?” rather than “why should we?” regarding transparency, participation and collaboration. This is a much bigger charge than shepherding the obligatory release of non-threatening data sets or encouraging the use of social networking. This requires a core shift how we think about and execute against our missions.

Networks are the power source. Not social networking tools or technology networks, but, rather, people networks. What would surface if information sharing and access became the rule rather than the exception? What if there were members of the DoD community focused on the white spaces between components and missions rather than dedicated to the missions themselves? What if everyone was–and felt–responsible for contributing not just to their group’s mission, but to the larger DoD mission? We’d see things we don’t currently see. The network effect would exponentially enhance our situational awareness, strengthening it beyond what our current hierarchical structure is capable of.

Open government is not a side project. It’s not a secondary mission. Open Government can be the catalyst, vision and initiative for tying together disparate programs and concepts to strengthen the whole organization. The Open Government Working Group has the opportunity define and drive the cultural shift that is necessary for DoD to continue to successfully meet its core mission in a networked world: to protect and defend our nation.